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Out Of The Goodness Of My Heart, I Give You This Child
I.

Introduction
Advancements in medical technology have improved many areas of the medical field,

allowing doctors to discover new treatments and procedures to benefit the health and needs of
patients. One area that has continued to advance is assisted reproductive technology. 1 As a result
of the advancement, the number of people using assisted reproductive technology has increased. 2
Approximately 8% of women in the United States will seek infertility treatment and the
assistance of technology to become or stay pregnant. 3 One form of assisted reproductive
technology that has expanded with the advancement of technology is surrogacy. 4
The use of surrogates in the United States has enabled couples previously unable to
conceive or carry a child of their own to become parents and start a family. 5 There are two types
of surrogacy agreements: traditional and gestational. 6 Both traditional and gestational surrogacy
agreements present moral, ethical and legal problems that the courts and legislatures are forced
to address.7 In order to address the public policy and legal concerns of surrogacy, this paper

1 John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental
Rights, 66 N.Y.U.L. REV. 353, 355 (1991) (noting that within the past two decades, the development of reproductive

technology has now separated the two processes of conception and gestation).
2 Naomi Cahn, Do Tell the Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring, 42 HOFST RA L. REV.1077, 1082 (2014) (noting
that the use of infertility services is increasing).
3 Id. at 1081 (nothing the number of women in the United States experiencing infertility).
4 See generally, Hill, supra note 1, at 554-55 (noting that advancements in surrogacy now provide for the potential
of five parents and 16 parental combinations).
5 Alyssa James, Gestational Surrogacy Agreements: Why Indiana Should Honor Them and What Physicians Should
Know Until They Do, 10 IND. HEALT H L. REV. 175, 176 (2013) (arguing that surrogacy has allowed infertile women
in the United States to become parents).
6 Mark Strasser, Traditional Surrogacy Contracts, Partial Enforcement, and the Challenge for Family Law , 18 J.
HEALT H CARE L. & POL’Y 85, 87-88 (2015) (explaining the two types of surrogacy procedures).
7 Christine Metteer Lorillard, Informed Choices and Uniform Decisions: Adopting the ABA’s Self-Enforcing
Administrative Model to Ensure Successful Surrogacy Arrangements, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 237, 238 (2010)
(explaining that even though surrogacy and the number of couples choosing to use reproductive technologies to
reproduce are faced with the moral, economic and legal obstacles these technologies produce).
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argues that the United States should adopt a model similar to the United Kingdom’s model of
surrogacy agreements, and develop a uniform act that bans commercial surrogacy and requires
that surrogacy agreements be based on altruistic motives.
Part II will examine the moral, ethical and legal concerns of surrogacy agreements that
arise for the children born of a surrogacy agreement, to the surrogate, and the harms and
concerns to the intended parents. In determining the current law in different jurisdictions
throughout the United States, Part III will examine how courts have determined whether
surrogacy arrangements are valid and enforceable. Part IV of the paper will examine the United
Kingdom’s approach to surrogacy agreements as well as the potential problems with the model
the United Kingdom has implemented. Finally, Part V proposes that the United States should
adopt a model similar to the United Kingdom’s surrogacy agreement approach, and adopt a
uniform surrogacy act that prohibits commercial surrogacy and requires altruistic motivations for
entering into the agreement.
II.

Moral, Ethical, Social and Legal Concerns of Surrogacy
As advanced reproductive technologies have become more sophisticated, surrogacy has

emerged as possible method to assist couples in beginning a family.8 However, surrogacy
agreements are controversial because they present moral, ethical social and legal concerns for all
of the parties involved in the agreement.9 The parties involved that could be victimized by the
surrogacy agreements include the unborn fetus, the surrogate women, and the intended parents.10
In order to understand the moral, ethical, social and legal concerns surrounding surrogacy

8

Id. at 242 (explaining that surrogacy is a relatively new advancement, only becoming widely available in the
1980s).
9 Id.
10 Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate- Focused Model of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 18 CARDOZO
J.L. & GENDER 391, 398-409 (2012) (describing the concerns of surrogacy and the harms that could arise to the
parties involved in the contract and the unborn fetus).
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agreements, it is important to understand what surrogacy is and the two types of surrogacy
agreements available.
Surrogacy is an agreement entered into by a woman, the surrogate, which provides that
the surrogate will become pregnant and gestate a fetus on behalf of the intended parents. 11 The
two types of surrogacy agreements are: traditional and gestational.12 A traditional surrogate
becomes pregnant via artificial insemination with the contracting father’s sperm or donor
sperm.13 The donor sperm can be either from an anonymous or a known donor.14 Further, in
traditional surrogacy, the surrogate provides the ovum, creating a genetic and biological link
between the surrogate and the child. 15 Alternatively, in a gestational surrogacy, the surrogate has
no genetic link to the child.16 Rather, the intended parents supply either their own or a donor’s
ovum, which is then fertilized with the intended father’s or donor sperm and the resulting
embryo is implanted in the gestational surrogate’s uterus.17 The gestational surrogate then
carries the embryo to term, creating only a biological link to the child.18 Both traditional and
gestational surrogacy arrangements pose moral, ethical and legal concerns for the parties
involved.19
A. Harm to the Unborn Fetus

11

See generally, Strasser, supra note 6, at 87-88. (describing the two kinds of surrogacy: traditional and gestational).
Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See, London, supra note 10, at 394. (explaining the biological and genetic relationship between the parties of the
surrogacy agreement and the unborn fetus in each of the two types of surrogacy arrangement).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See, Lorillard, supra note 7, at 238.
12
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Baby Selling
One of the prominent concerns in the surrogacy debate is that surrogacy equates to
commodification of children.20 In surrogacy agreements, the surrogate typically receives
compensation solely for rendering services.21 However, because the payment to the surrogate is
contingent upon the surrogate relinquishing custody of the child, opponents claim that the
payment for services rendered is a proxy for illegal baby selling.22 Further, critics also claim that
surrogacy degrades children by treating them as merchandise that can easily be sold for a
profit.23
The fear that surrogacy constitutes baby- selling has been a central reason given by courts
for invalidating surrogacy agreements. 24 Surrogacy entered the national legal discourse in the
New Jersey Supreme Court case, In re Baby M, discussed in greater detail in Part III.25 In their
holding, the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated and refused to enforce a surrogacy contract
because it was void against public policy and conflicted with the state statute.26 The court noted
that New Jersey law, N.J.S.A. 9:3-54a, prohibits the paying for or accepting money in connection
with any placement of a child for adoption.27 The court reasoned that baby-selling has inherent
evils for the child, because the child is sold without regard for whether the purchasers will be
20

E.g., London, supra note 10, at 498-400 (presenting opposing views regarding baby-selling in regards to
surrogacy agreements).
21 Id. at 498.
22 Id. (arguing that opponents of surrogacy do not view the payment received by the surrogates is for their services
rendered, but rather, the surrogates are actually receiving the payment in exchange for a child, constituting a sale of
the child).
23 Elizabeth S. Scott, Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchange: Surrogacy and the Politics of
Commodification, 72 LAW & CONT EMP . PROB. 109, 112 (2009) (describing the view proposed by opponents of
surrogacy during the In re Baby M case).
24 See, In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 423-25 (N.J. 1988).
25 E.g., Yehezkel Margalit, In Defense of Surrogacy Agreements: A Modern Contract Perspective, 20 W M. & M ARY
J. OF W OMEN & L. 423, 428 (2014).
26 See generally, In re Baby M, supra note 24 at 430-36 (arguing that the agreement was in violation of the state
statute which prohibited the exchange of money for a child within the state and was against public policy because it
promotes the permanent separation of the child from one of its natural parents).
27 See, Id. at 423. (explaining that New Jersey state statute prohibits the exchange of money for a child); See also,
N.J. Stat. § 9:3-54.
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suitable parents.28 Further, the court held that it is in the best interest of the child to remain with
their natural parents, which critics of surrogacy have argued allows the mother-child relationship
to foster by allowing the child the opportunity bond with the women.29
B. Harm to the Surrogate
Commodification of Women
In addition to the commodification of children, opposition to surrogacy also rests on the
belief that surrogacy is the commodification of a woman’s body. 30 Opponents claim that
surrogacy is a form of prostitution.31 Third parties, such as fertility treatment clinics, that foster
the relationship between the intended parents and surrogates act as “pimps” who sell the
reproductive ability of women.32 Instead of embracing the unique capability of a woman’s body
to bear a child, they reduce it to a commodity and rent the womb for nine months at a time. 33
Surrogacy agreements are also opposed on the assertion that surrogacy constitutes
reproductive slavery.34 Surrogacy is an expensive process to endure and costs thousands of
dollars.35 As a result, women of higher socioeconomic status, typically Caucasian women, are
more likely to be able to afford to hire a surrogate of a lower socioeconomic position. 36 As many

28

Id. at 425.
Id. at 435 (expressing their desire to keep children with their natural parents and to avoid unnecessary separation
consistent with adoption law in New Jersey).
30 Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a Commodification of Women’s
Bodies and Children?, 12 W IS. W OMEN’S L.J. 113, 161-62 (1997) (expressing the views of opponents that surrogacy
is a commodification of a women’s reproductive abilities).
31 Id.
32 E.g., Id. at 162 (describing the relationship between the surrogate women and the doctors and lawyers who are in
the business of fostering relationships in order for profit).
33 E.g., Id.
34 Id.
35 See generally, Circle Surrogacy, Anticipated Costs for Gestational Surrogacy,
http://www.circlesurrogacy.com/costs (providing anticipated payment price to participate in gestational surrogacy
agreements and allowing viewers to individualize situation for a predicated cost of services).
36 See, London, supra note 10, at 405-06 (arguing that because of the high expense of surrogacy procedures,
individuals who occupy higher socioeconomic, who tend to be Caucasian, will more likely be able to afford to
higher a surrogate, which evidence suggests typically tend to occupy lower socioeconomic statuses, composed of a
large number minorities).
29
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minorities tend to occupy the position of lower socioeconomic statuses, minorities once again
become slaves, providing undervalued services while subjugated to the needs and desires of the
Caucasian women in society.37 The womb of African American or minority women becomes a
commodity that the white women can rent for nine months. 38 Upon the completion of the task,
the birth of the child, the minority women are dismissed from the life of the child and the white
family whom they have provided services for, and become available for the next white family
that can afford to hire them.39 Because the reproductive technologies are expensive, the minority
women in lower socioeconomic communities are typically able to provide these services, but the
lack of ability to afford these services for themselves reinforces notion that surrogacy is a
method available only for white women and families.

40

Therefore, minority raced women are exploited because they are expected to provide
their bodies to upper middle class women who are usually Caucasian, at a monetary rate that is
undervalued and essentially encouraging reproductive slavery.
Economic Exploitation
As stated above, although not empirical, data thus far collected from couples whom are
exploring the potential use of surrogacy tend to hold professional positions in the workforce,
while surrogates generally are of a lower socioeconomic status. 41 Those that oppose surrogacy
arrangements fear that women who agree to act as surrogates expose themselves to the risk of

37

See, Id.
See, Id.
39 See generally, April J. Cherry, Nurturing in the Service of White Culture: Racial Subordination, Gestational
Surrogacy, and the Ideology of Motherhood, 10 TEX. J. W OMEN & L. 83 (2001) (comparing the similarities between
historical treatment of African American women as mothers and slaves to the role of African American women as
surrogates).
40 E.g., London, supra note 10, at 408 (describing how “the reproductive rights agendas are shaped by the dynamics
of class and race.”).
41 Id. at 405-06.
38
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economic exploitation, as many may be in need of the money. 42 The financial vulnerability that
the women in lower socioeconomic classes endure creates the risk that the commissioning
couples may take advantage, by providing minimal compensation disproportion to the services
rendered, realizing that these women are desperately in need of any financial payment they can
obtain.43
The fear of economic exploitation by fertility clinics is also a concern of many
opponents. Surrogate pregnancies have been estimated to cost between $80,000 and $120,000
per pregnancy.44 However, surrogates typically only receive ¼ of the total cost in payment, as
the base fee compensation for surrogates is between $25,000 and $30,000, subject to increase if
there are external factors that may increase compensation.45 When examining a $30,000 base
price that surrogates may receive over a 9 month period, the payment of the surrogates hourly is
vastly below the federal minimum wage, at approximately $4 per hour.
Because surrogate women generally occupy a lower socioeconomic status in society, it is
often difficult for the women to obtain employment.46 Therefore, the potential lack of alternative
employment surrogates may enter the agreement in order to ensure they have an income, even
when the payment is low and can cause a health risk.47

42

Id. at 406 (explaining that a lack of employment and economic income placed these women in vulnerable where
positions where their decision to enter into the agreement may no longer be voluntary, but rather what must be done
to survive).
43 See, Id. at 408 (arguing that because of the economic status of the commissioning couples, the wealth they can
offer the surrogate in need of the money, no matter how little in value, may be accepted by the surrogate in order to
guarantee income).
44 Christopher White, Surrogate Parenthood for Money if a Form of Human Trafficking , (April 4, 2014)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/learnvest/2012/07/23/the-newest-wave-in-outsourcing-to-india-surrogate-pregnancies/
45 See generally, Circle Surrogacy, How Much do Surrogates Get Paid?
http://www.circlesurrogacy.com/surrogates/how-much-do-surrogates-get-paid (discussing how much surrogates
usually receive for their services and different factors that may increase or decrease their compensation value).
46 See, Mark Strasser, Parental Rights Terminations: On Surrogate Reasons and Surrogacy Policies, 60 Tenn. L.
Rev. 135, 141 (1992) (arguing that there must not be any other forms of employment for these women to obtain
because if they had the choice, they would not become surrogates).
47 Id.
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Informed Consent
Another criticism of surrogacy agreements is that the surrogate may be harmed because
they are not capable of fully consenting to the surrogacy arrangement. 48 Those who believe that
women are not capable of providing informed consent when entering into a surrogacy agreement
believe that potential surrogates are unable to grasp the potential psychological risks associated
with carrying a child.49 This belief is founded on the assumption that a surrogate is not able to
foresee the possible emotional attachment she may develop with the child during gestation. 50 The
concern that a woman is not capable of providing informed consent was highlighted in the
decision, In re Baby M, as the reason the surrogate refused to surrender Baby M and terminate
her parental rights was because she felt a strong bond and connection with the child, as she was
both the gestational and biological mother.51 Although In re Baby M demonstrates the concern of
many, empirical studies have found that situations similar to what occurred in In re Baby M is
not pervasive amongst surrogates.52
However, the decision to void surrogacy arrangements on the belief that woman are
incapable of informed consent because they cannot foresee an emotional attachment to the child
upon the birth perpetuates male dominance in society and allows for the continued exploitation
of women.53 By entertaining these concerns, the attitude that women in need of a man’s guidance

48

See generally, London, supra note 10, at 400- 02.
Id. at 400 (arguing that pregnancy may result in a psychological connection to the child that a woman cannot
predict occurring prior to the pregnancy and she therefore cannot give informed consent because she is not capable
of understanding and comprehending the potential outcomes).
50 E.g., Id.
51 See, In re Baby M, supra note 24, at 415 (describing how the surrogate refused to comply with the agreement to
relinquish the child because she had not anticipated the emotional attachment and bond she felt with t he child).
52 See, London, supra note 10, at 401 and n.90. (describing empirical evidence concluding that none of the surveyed
surrogates expressed doubt in regards to their decision to relinquish the child to the intended parents).
53 See, Id. at 401 (arguing that the advancement of this argument will undermine the feminist theory of selfautonomy).
49
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in order to protect her psychological well-being continues to invade society.54 By continuing to
endorse the belief that women are incapable of providing informed consent, women’s decision
making ability will continue to be considered inferior to that of the men’s.55
C. Harm to the Intended Parents
Economic exploitation
Intended parents risk being the victim of economic exploitation different than that of the
surrogates because the intended parents typically are in a higher socioeconomic class.56
However, the intended parents are vulnerable to being exploited because of their desire for
children and to have a family.57 For some example, the desire of intended parent’s to have a child
via surrogacy costs them their life savings and did not result in a child, as the intended parents
continued to provide compensation to a fertility clinic based on fraudulent statements made by
the clinic.58 Unfortunately, by the time the couple realized the scheme, it was already to0 late and
their vulnerability and desire for a child led to their economic exploitation.59
Surrogacy arrangements produce ethical, moral and legal problems for society.60 The
central concerns of surrogacy arrangements revolve around the harm that can result from their
creation to the child born via a surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate mother, and the intended

54 Id.
55 Id.
56

See, Julie Shapiro, For a Feminist Considering Surrogacy, Is Compensation Really the Key Question? , 89 W ASH.
L. REV. 1345, 1349 (2014) (arguing that the intended parents typically are in a higher socioeconomic status than the
surrogate, but the intended parents are still vulnerable to economic exploitation, even if for a different reason).
57 See, Id. at 1349 n.20 (arguing that intended parents may be economically exploited because of their willingness to
spend an amount necessary to fulfill their desire to have a child).
58 See, Tamar Lewin, A Surrogacy Agency that Delivered Heartache, (July 27, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/us/surrogacy-agency-planet-hospital-delivered-heartache.html (explaining how
a couple unknowingly relied on fraudulent statements and kept providing payment to a fertility clinic that took the
money but did not provide for a surrogate or child).
59 Id.
60 See, Lorillard, supra note 7, at 238.
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parents of the child.61 Some of the concerns that both opponent and proponents of surrogacy
have addressed are the commodification of women and children, racial exploitation of surrogate
women, economic exploitation of both the surrogate mother and the intended parents and
whether the surrogate woman has the ability to provide informed consent to enter in the
surrogacy agreement.62 Considering all of the concerns of surrogacy that scholars have eluded to,
the courts in the United States have been attempted to approach surrogacy in a manner what
would best protect all of the parties involved. However, in trying to do so, courts have taken
different perspectives to the best approach to prevent these potential harms. The current law in
the United States are inconsistent, leaving parties uncertain of their rights when entering into a
surrogacy agreement.
III.

Current Law
In most cases, before a surrogate become pregnant, the contracting parents and the

surrogate execute an agreement setting forth the terms of the arrangement and indicating who
will be the parents of the child when the child is born.63 Most surrogacy agreements will never be
reviewed by a judge because in most cases, the parties comply with the terms of the agreement.
When they do not, however, they present intractable legal, ethical, and moral questions as we
have seen. This part examines cases in the United States and the approaches different state courts
and legislatures have taken when addressing the enforceability and validity of surrogacy
agreements.
A. The Perspective of the Courts

61 See generally, London, supra note 10, 398-408.
62

Id.

63 E.g., In re Baby M, supra note 24, at 411 (explaining that the two parties, the surrogate and the intended parents,

had entered into a surrogacy agreement).
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New Jersey
Surrogacy entered the spotlight of discussion with the decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court case In re Baby M, the first surrogacy case to reach a state supreme court.

64

This

case involved a traditional surrogacy agreement between Ms. Whitehead, the surrogate, and Mr.
Stern, the contracting father who was also the genetic father.65 Ms. Whitehead agreed to serve as
a surrogate for Mr. Stern and his wife, who was unable to conceive and carry a baby to term. 66
Upon the birth of the child, Ms. Whitehead would surrender the child to Mr. Stern and his wife
as well as renounce her parental rights, allowing Mrs. Stern to legally adopt the child as her
own.67 However, after the birth of the child, Ms. Whitehead refused to comply with the terms of
the contract, and refused to deliver Baby M to the Sterns or relinquish her parental rights.68 As a
result, Mr. Stern filed a complaint to have the surrogacy agreement enforced. 69 The New Jersey
trial court held that the surrogacy agreement was valid and should be enforced, thereby declaring
Mr. and Mrs. Stern the legal parents of Baby M as stipulated by the contract. 70
Following the decision of the trial court, Ms. Whitehead appealed.71 The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the surrogacy agreement
between Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead was invalid and would not enforce the agreement.72 As a
result, the Supreme Court retracted Mrs. Stern status as the legal mother and alternatively held

64

E.g., Shapiro, supra note 56, at 1053 (explaining this was the first case to discuss surrogacy).
See generally, In re Baby M, supra note 24, at 411 (discussing the general background information and facts of
the case).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 412.
68 Id. at 414-15.
69 Id. at 415 (filing complaint requesting the enforcement of the surrogacy contract).
70 See, Id. at 418-19 (concluding that the statutes governing the matter, such as adoption and termination of parental
rights did not apply to surrogacy contracts because the legislative intent was not to include surrogacy in statutes).
71 Id. at 419
72 See, Id. at 421-22 (holding that the surrogacy contract was invalid and unenforceable because it conflicted with
New Jersey statutes and void against public policy).
65
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that Ms. Whitehead was the child’s legal mother.73 The court reasoned that a contract that
requires an exchange of money for the surrender of a child is void because it is against public
policy and constitutes “baby-selling.”74 The court held that “our law prohibits paying or
accepting money in connection with any placement of a child for adoption.”75 Irrespective of the
Supreme Court’s holding, custody of Baby M was awarded to Mr. and Mrs. Stern in the best
interest of the child, as the Court reasoned Ms. Whitehead had an unstable home environment to
raise the child.76 The decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court firmly established that couples
and surrogates in New Jersey entering into surrogacy agreements would not be afforded
protection to enforce the agreement from the courts if an issue were to arise.
The New Jersey Supreme Court again addressed the issue of surrogacy agreements
fourteen years following the In re Baby M case in the case In re T.J.S.. 77 However, unlike In re
Baby M, In re T.J.S. involved a gestational surrogacy agreement.78 The Plaintiffs, T.J.S. and
A.L.S were married and A.L.S. was unable to carry a baby to term. 79 In order to conceive a child,
the couple decided that T.J.S. would contribute sperm to fertilize the ovum of an anonymous
donor.80 Once fertilized, the embryo would be implanted into the uterus of A.F.81 The surrogate,
A.F., entered into the contract with T.J.S. and A.L.S. and was not related to either T.J.S, A.L.S,
or the ovum donor.82

73

Id.
Id.
75 Id. at 396.
76 Id. at 457.
77 In re T.J.S., 212 N.J. 334 (N.J. 2012)
78 E.g., See generally, Id. at 335 (indicating that the ovum was to be from that of a anonymous donor, not the
surrogate).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
74

13

Prior to the birth of the child, T.J.S. and A.L.S. sought an order from the court to declare
A.L.S. the mother of the child.83 The court entered the order and upon the child’s birth, A.L.S.
was listed on the child’s birth certificate as the mother in compliance with the order. 84 However,
after the order was issued, the Department of Health and Human Services sought to have the
order vacated, arguing that it was improper for the court to declare A.L.S. mother because a New
Jersey state statute, N.J.S.A. 9:3-41(e) stated that a gestational surrogate cannot relinquish her
parental rights until seventy-two hours after the birth of the child. 85 Because A.L.S. was declared
the mother prior to A.F.’s relinquishing of her parental rights, A.L.S.’ title as mother needed to
be removed from the birth certificate of the child.86
The issue before the court was whether the New Jersey Parentage Act violated the equal
protection clause by declaring an infertile male the automatic father of a child genetically related
to his wife who had been artificially inseminated, while failing to recognize an infertile woman
the automatic mother of a child genetically related to her husband, and that was born to a
surrogate.87 The trial court granted the state’s motion to vacate the declaration of A.L.S. as the
legal mother on the birth certificate and held that the New Jersey Parentage Act was
constitutional.88 In affirming the lower courts, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that “the
status of maternity is grounded either in a biological or genetic connection to the child.”89
Because A.L.S. was not biologically related to the child, as she did not gestate the child, or

83

Id. (explaining that the order from the Superior Court would have mandated that the intended mother, A.L.S.
would have been declared as the mother on the child’s birth certificate at the time of birth).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 336, 347; See also, N.J. Stat. § 9:3-41.
86 See, Id. at 336 (explaining that the Department of Health and Human Services said there was no basis for the relief
that the plaintiffs requested and therefore the relief was invalid).
87 See generally, Id. at 334
88 Id.
89 Id. at 336.
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genetically related, as A.L.S. did not provide the ovum, the only option that remained to declare
A.L.S as the mother was though adoption.90
California
Five years after the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In re Baby M, the California
Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of a gestational surrogacy contract in Johnson v.
Calvert.91 Mr. and Mrs. Calvert entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement with Anna
Johnson.92 Anna Johnson agreed to carry to term an embryo created with the Calvert’s gametes.93
Just as In re Baby M and In re T.J.S., Ms. Johnson agreed to surrender all parental rights upon
the birth of the child.94 However, the relationship between the Calverts and Ms. Johnson
deteriorated during the pregnancy and as a result, Ms. Johnson refused to relinquish the baby to
the Calverts.95
At the birth of the child, both women claimed to be the child’s mother. 96 Mrs. Calvert, the
intended mother, claimed to be the mother because the child was genetically hers. 97
Alternatively, Ms. Johnson, the surrogate, claimed to be the mother because the child was
biologically hers as she had gestated the child.98 Unlike the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re
Baby M, the California Supreme Court enforced the surrogacy contract and concluded that in
gestational surrogacy agreements, the intent of the parties would be a dispositive factor in

90

Id.
Johnson v. Calvert, 5. Cal. 4th 84 (Cal. 1993).
92 Id. at 87
93 Id. (indicating that the surrogacy agreement was a gestational surrogacy).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 87-88
96 Id. at 88.
97 Id.
98 Id.
91
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deciding parentage.99 Therefore, because Mr. and Mrs. Calvert were the intended parents, they
were the child’s legal parents.100
Five years after Calvert v. Johnson was decided, the California Court of Appeals held in
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, that gestational surrogacy agreements are enforceable even if the
intended parents are not genetically related to the child so long as the surrogate herself was not
genetically related to the child.101 The court reasoned that the intended parents would be the legal
parents of the child because it was their consent to a medical procedure that caused the
procreation of a child.102 But for the actions of the intended parents, the child would not have
come to existence.103 The court iterated that “the people who ‘choose’ to bring a child into being
are likely to have the child’s best interest at heart,” and therefore, the legal parents should be the
intended parents.104
Tennessee
The Tennessee Supreme Court in the matter, In re C.K.G. determined that the intent of
the parties involved would not be a dispositive factor, but that it should be taken in consideration
when determining parentage.105 In In re C.K.G., Dr. Charles K.G. and Ms. Cindy C. decided to
have a child and pursued in vitro fertilization through a fertility clinic. 106 Although the parties
were not married, both parties understood and expected that they would raise the children

99

Id. at 93 (stating that when one woman contributes genetically to the child and the other biologically as the
gestator, the woman that intended to procreate the child is the natural mother under California law.
100 Id.
101 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 1410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
102 Id. at 1410.
103 Id. at 1425-26
104 Id. at 1425
105 See generally, In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 728 (Tenn. 2005) (explaining that the court is declining to adopt
the intent test of California, but will consider intent amongst other factors when examining the facts of a particular
case).
106 Id. at 717
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together.107 Because of Cindy’s age, the two parties agreed to enter into a joint contract that
stated that Cindy would use an anonymous donor ovum and Charles’ sperm to conceive the child
and explicitly included that although the children would not be genetically related to Cindy, she
would be the mother of any children born to her as a result of the egg donation.108 Both parties
signed the contract and soon after the implementation of the embryos, Cindy became pregnant
with triplets.109 At the birth of the children, the birth certificate listed Cindy as the mother and
Charles as the father.110
After the children were born, the relationship between Charles and Cindy deteriorated.111
Charles became distant and less involved with the children and withheld financial support from
Cindy and his children.112 As a result, Cindy sought to have parentage established and wanted to
obtain custody of the children and child support from Charles.113 In response, Charles argued that
Cindy was not the mother of the children because she lacked a genetic connection.114 In response
to the petition, the juvenile court held that Cindy “is the birth mother and always had the intent to
bring these children for herself and Charles.”115 The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile
court’s decision and adopted the intent test established in Johnson v. Calvert, holding that the
issue of who the parents of the children are should be determined by examining the intent of the
parties and not only genetic contribution. 116 However, the Supreme Court of Tennessee refused
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to adopt the intent test.117 Instead, the Court decided that to determine the enforceability of the
agreement in declaring the mother of the children, they would look at particular factors in
making their decision.118 In their case analysis, the Court held that the relevant factors in
determining motherhood were: genetics, intent, gestation, and the absence of controversy
between the gestator and the genetic “mother.”119 In examining these four factors, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee concluded that Cindy was the legal mother of the children because Cindy
had the intent to raise the children, had gestated the children creating a biological connection,
and the genetic mother was an anonymous ovum donor who was not seeking parental rights or
status.120
In an attempt to address the moral, ethical and legal concerns associated with surrogacy
agreements, three different state courts provided three different approaches for determining the
legal mother of the child born via a surrogate. The inconsistency in approaches determined by
the court to provide for the best interests of all the parties involved is troublesome for parties
contemplating entering into surrogacy agreements, as it may be unclear what their rights are if
the relationship were to deteriorate or an issue were to arise. Therefore, an examination of other
surrogacy models may provide a solution for the United States in helping to guide courts when
determining motherhood and the validity and enforceability of surrogacy arrangements.

IV.

The Model Across the Pond: A Look at Surrogacy In the United Kingdom
Because courts in the United States have continued to adopt different approaches for

determining parentage in surrogacy agreement, couples and surrogates who enter into the
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agreements are left with constant uncertainty of how a court is likely to decide the outcome of
the case if an issue were to arise. In order to provide certainty and consistency to the parties of
surrogacy contracts, the United States should adopt an approach to surrogacy agreements similar
to that of the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom’s first impression with surrogacy was in 1985 when the first child,
Baby Cotton, was born via a surrogate in the country. 121 At the time, the United Kingdom did not
have a statute that legally banned the practice of surrogacy.122 However, prior to the birth of
Baby Cotton the United Kingdom government had commissioned a committee, the Warnock
Committee, to investigate advanced reproductive technologies such as surrogacy.123 Based upon
the recommendations of the committee, the government enacted the Surrogacy Arrangements
Act of 1985.124
The Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985 is a uniform law that made it a criminal offense for
any party of the surrogacy arrangement to receive financial benefit for participating in the
arrangement.125 A person violates this provision of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985 if
they: “(a ) initiate or take part in any negotiations with a view to the making of a surrogacy
arrangement, (b) offer or agree to negotiate the making of a surrogacy arrangement, or (c)
compile any information with a view to its use in making, or negotiating the making of,
surrogacy arrangement.”126 If a party to the arrangement or a third party, such as members of the
surrogate or intended parent’s family, are found to have made or received payments in violation

See, Austin Caster, Don’t Split the Baby: How the U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and Unnecessary Litigation and
Promote Equality by Emulating the British Surrogacy Law Regime, 10 CONN. PUB. INT . L.J. 477, 492 (2011).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 492-93
124 Id. at 493
125 See generally, Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, c. 49 (1985), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/49 (detailing the possible penalties that could result from a violation of
the Act).
126 Id. (explaining what constitutes a violation of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act)
121

19

of this section of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985, the individual faces the possibility of
a monetary fine or imprisonment not exceeding 3 months time. 127
Although the committee recommended that criminal law penalties be implemented to deter
commercialized surrogacy, the committee did not reject surrogacy arrangements wholly.128
Instead, the committee recommended the allowance of altruistically motivated surrogacy
arrangements without punishment.129 In arrangements motivated by altruism, there is no
exchange of money for services rendered, but the government does allow the surrogate to be
compensated for “reasonable expenses.”130 However, the government did not elaborate or define
what would consist a reasonable expense. 131
In addition to requiring surrogacy arrangements be non-commercialized, the United
Kingdom also recommends that the intended parents of the child should be listed as the parents
on the birth certification in order to help avoid litigation. 132 In support of the decision to list the
intended parents on the birth certificate, the United Kingdom examined other areas of law and
circumstances that had arisen.133
A. Problems with the Approach Taken by the United Kingdom
One criticism of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985 is that the Act never defined what
constitutes a “reasonable expense” leaving uncertainty as to whether a payment is a violation of
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the Act.134 Because it is the responsibility of the parties to determine what constitutes a
“reasonable expense,” the seemingly easy to administer law now lends itself to the possibility of
abuse and leaves the parties with uncertainty as to whether they would be subject to potential
criminal liability against them.135
In addition, although the United Kingdom approach recommends the intended mother by
listed as the mother, the intended mother is not automatically listed as the legal mother of the
child on the birth certificate.136 Rather, the surrogate is listed on the birth certificate
automatically as the legal mother because of her biological connection to the child.137 In order
for the intended mother to be considered the legal mother, the surrogate must sign a parental
order after the birth transferring her parental rights to the intended mother. 138 Because the United
Kingdom does not consider the surrogacy arrangements binding on the parties, if the surrogate
deviates from the arrangement and upon the birth refuses to relinquish her parental rights, the
court will not enforce the order and the intended mother will not be listed on the birth
certificate.139 Therefore, incapable of predicting how parties to the arrangement will act during
and after the pregnancy, both intended parents and surrogates have little certainty as to the
possible outcome of the arrangement upon execution of the contract.
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V.

Proposals and Recommendations for the United States
Because of the advancements to reproductive technology in the last few years, surrogacy

has involuntarily led us to live in a world where a child may have as many as sixteen potential
parental combinations.140 As there are approximately six million women that suffer from an
infertility problem, and as technology continues to advance it is likely that the number of women
who elect to explore surrogacy or other infertility methods will continue to increase. 141 In order
to avoid excessive litigation and uncertainty as to the parentage of the child, the United States
must adopt a model of uniform surrogacy regulation, similar to the system enacted in the United
Kingdom. Authorizing a system in which surrogacy agreements are non-commercial and the
intended parents are declared the parents of the child will eliminate virtually all of the concerns
surrogacy agreements are often forced to overcome.
A. Proposed Law for the United States
The proposed law that the United States should adopt must be a uniform federal law that
all states are required to abide by. The law will require that:
(1) No person in the United States shall engage in commercial surrogacy which includes:
“(a) initiate or take part in any negotiations with a view to the making of a surrogacy
arrangement,
(b) offer or agree to negotiate the making of a surrogacy arrangement, or
(c) compile any information with a view to its use in making, or negotiating the making
of, surrogacy arrangements;”142
(2) All persons engaged in surrogacy arrangements shall:
(a) be engaged in the arrangement for altruistic motivations
(b) make and receive payments through an approved third party organization for the sole
purpose of medical and legal expenses
(3) For the purposes of this section, a person does an act on a commercial basis if:
140
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(a) any payment is at any time received by himself or another in respect of making,
negotiating or facilitating the making of any surrogacy agreement.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this Act shall potentially:
(a) be subject to a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment of no more than 6 months time, or
both.
(5) Motherhood:
(a) in defining “motherhood,” the intended mother will automatically be declared to be
the legal parent on the birth certificate at the birth of the child.

Uniformity of the Law
Adopting a uniform federal law will eliminate the uncertainty that parties to the
surrogacy agreement encounter when executing the agreement. Because the courts of the states
have interpreted “motherhood” using a variety of tests, both the surrogate and the intended
parents are left with uncertainty of the outcome if the relationship between the parties
deteriorates. A uniform law declaring the intended parents as the mother and the father on the
birth certificate at birth will provide consistency and less uncertainty for the parties to the
agreement. For example, if a child is born in New Jersey to a surrogate, but the surrogacy
contract was entered into and executed in California, the courts no longer have to decide which
state has jurisdiction or whether the New Jersey approach to determining motherhood via
surrogacy or California approach should apply. Instead, both the parties and the courts will be
certain of the answer prior to entering the agreement because regardless of the jurisdiction, the
intended parents will be the legal parents.
Requiring the Surrogate to have an Altruistic Motivation
The requirement of compensation in exchange for surrogacy services is problematic.143
Concerns such as the commodification of women and children and the exploitation of women, in
particular of minorities, are real harms that society needs to be aware of when allowing for the
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compensation to occur.144 Although the United Kingdom surrogacy model allows for the
compensation of “reasonable expenses,” the United Kingdom’s lack of guidance on what a
“reasonable expense” has to the potential to lead to abuse; the exception to the United
Kingdom’s general rule allows for all the public policy concerns proposed in the United States to
become a reality.145 Therefore, in order to eliminate the potential of racial and economic
exploitation and the commodification of women and children, the best option for the United
States is to adopt a uniform policy that bans commercial surrogacy and allows altruistically
motivated surrogacy permitting for a surrogate to receive compensation only for medical and
legal expenses related to the surrogacy arrangement.
Economic Exploitation
By eliminating surrogacy compensation for services rendered, the United States will be
able to reduce the risk of economic and racial exploitation of women. The concern in the United
States by those who oppose surrogacy is that women who elect to be surrogates are at risk for
being exploited economically due to the unequal balance of power of the parties to the
agreement.146
Requiring an altruistic motivation ensures that women of a lower socioeconomic status
do not run the risk of being economically exploited, because the financial incentives for both the
intended parents and the women in a lower socioeconomic status are eliminated. By eliminating
the financial gain of compensation, women of a lower socioeconomic status have no incentive,
except for altruism, to undertake the role of a surrogate because they will not receive monetary
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support. This will protect surrogates from being coerced by men, such as their husbands, to
become a surrogate for the financial gain. As a result, men in society will no longer feel the need
to subjugate women to a position of surrogacy because they will receive no financial benefit
from doing so. Women who will become surrogates will do so because they want to do so, not
because they are going to receive a financial benefit, exposing them to risk.
Further, by eliminating the compensation requirement, the potential risk of economic
exploitation to the intended parents is also eliminated.147 Many intended parents are in a
vulnerable state, as they desire to have a child and may not be able to bear a child of their own
for a variety of reasons.148 As many couples who seek surrogacy as an option for reproduction
are affluent, their desire to have a child may place them at an increased risk of economic
exploitation by the fertility clinic and also by the lower income women who are aware of the
affluence of the couple and may prey upon the intended parents vulnerability and desire to elicit
more compensation in exchange for the child.149
In order to prevent violations of the federal law, the legalized compensation between the
surrogate and intended parents for the approved medical and legal expenses should occur though
a third-party broker. In order to receive a payment, the surrogate must submit an itemized bill
from the doctor or lawyer indicated the fees in need of payment. The broker would then contact
the intended parents and inform them of the total costs that is owed. To fulfill the payment, the
intended parents would provide the fee to the broker, who would in turn, forward the costs to the
surrogate.
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The purpose of the third party is an attempt to minimize the contact between the
surrogate and the intended parents to reduce the risk that either side is exploited economically,
either by a demand for more compensation or a refusal to pay. Although the introduction of a
third party may not be able to eliminate the risk fully, if the exploitation does occur, the parties
may not feel pressure to acquiesce to the demands because the law will clearly establish that any
compensatory payment for services is prohibited and the intended parents will be the parents of
the child at birth.
Racial Exploitation
Additionally, with the elimination of compensation, more women will have the
opportunity to explore surrogacy, which in turn will eliminate the risk of racial exploitation.
Racial exploitation is a consequence of the economic exploitation risk that surrogacy poses when
compensation is involved.150 Given the costs of surrogacy in the United States, the evidence
demonstrates that most women who use a surrogate to have a child are wealthy. 151 As minorities
tend to encompass lower socioeconomic status groups, they inescapably are the group most
likely to serve as a surrogate for white women in the arrangements.152 However, with the
elimination of compensation, minority women from lower socioeconomic status who are
financially motivated will no longer agree desire become a surrogate. By eliminating the
incentive, financially motivated minority women may choose not to engage in the agreements,
thereby, diminishing their risk of being viewed as a reproductive slave to the white women’s
desire.
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Commodification of Children and Women
There is also the concern that surrogacy is a commodification of a woman’s body and of
children.153 However, if the United States adopts the altruistic motivation requirement for
surrogacy arrangements with the exception of medical and legal expenses, the concern that
surrogacy baby-selling is eliminated because there is absolutely no monetary exchange for the
child.
Just as the concern for baby-selling is eliminated with the prohibited compensation, the
same is true for the concern that surrogacy is selling women’s bodies and reproductive services.
Because no compensation is exchanged for the services provided by a surrogate, there is no sale
and her body and reproductive system is not being treated as a commodity capable of producing
an income.
Best Interest of the Parties
Furthermore, altruistic surrogacy agreements may be in the best interest of the future
child, intended parents, and surrogate. The New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Baby M raised the
concern that surrogacy has the potential to be detrimental to the psychological health of the child
or the woman.154 However, with the lack of compensation provided, the new law may encourage
altruistic surrogacy agreements amongst those who know each other. Therefore, if the surrogate
and intended parents have a relationship, the children may be able to better understand why they
were not gestated from their genetic mother because they will be able to have a relationship with
both parties.
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Additionally, commentators have suggested, “only where the surrogate herself finds it a
positive experience can surrogacy be deemed a success.”155 If the surrogate is motivated by
altruistic views, rather than in commercial surrogacy, she is more likely to find the experience
positive because it is something she decided to do, rather than feeling as if she is selling her body
or is being exploited for her services.
Declaration of the Intended Parents
The courts in the United States have taken different approaches in determining the
mother of a child born via surrogacy. As a result, the parties are left with uncertainty as to
whether they will legally be the mother at the end of the pregnancy. Therefore, to avoid the
uncertainty of the parties the uniform law should declare a consistent mother of the child, and
that mother should be the intended mother.
The intended mother and father of the child should always be listed as the legal parents
on the birth certificate because without their initiation and action, the child would not have been
brought into existence.156 Since the intended parents are the individuals who chose to bring the
child into existence, it is presumed that they will have the child’s best interest in mind to care for
the child.157
Punishment for Violations
Just as in the United Kingdom, if the surrogate, intended parents, or third party related to
either of the parties is determined to have violated the law in regards to compensation, a
monetary penalty or imprisonment should be imposed. By implementing the potential of a harsh
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imprisonment sentence and monetary fine, the goal is deter the parties from participating in the
violating act.
B. Enforcement and Compliance of the Law By the Government and Medical Profession
Enforcement and compliance with the law is imperative to ensure that commercial
surrogacy arrangements do not occur in the United States. To enforce compliance with the law,
the United States Department of Health & Human Resources would establish compliance
guidelines that each state’s Department of Health would be required to abide by in order to
enforce the federal law.
Based upon the guidelines established by the U.S. Department of Health & Human
Resources, each state is required to conduct unannounced inspections at registered fertility
clinics or offices of doctors that are known or suspected of engaging in fostering surrogacy
arrangements twice a year. In order to ensure each state complies with this requirement, the
federal government would have the right to withhold federal funding until the inspections within
the state are complete.
During inspections, the inspectors would be required to examine patient records for the
sole purpose of determining whether surrogacy arrangement documents exist. If a doctor or
fertility clinic is found to be in violation, the consequences of such a violation would be
dependent upon whether the violation had occurred previously. A doctor or clinic that is a first
time violator will be given a monetary fine at a rate to be determined by the individual state’s
Department of Health & Human Resources. For a second offense, the doctors and facility
engaged in the practice would be placed on a probationary status and would be required to be
monitored by the state’s medical licensing board. If the violation continues, the third cited
violation would result in a revocation of the doctor’s medical license, for no less than 9 months,
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with the possibility to reapply for their license after a certain period of specified time deemed
appropriate by the state licensing board. Further, during the time or revocation, the doctor would
be mandated to attend continuing medical education courses focused on the emotional, ethical
and legal concerns of surrogacy such as exploitation and commodification of women and
children. The sanctions are intended to be the minimum that that states would have to enforce,
but would be permitted to implement more restrictive sanctions if deemed necessary or
appropriate.
C. Anticipated Counterarguments
A major concern in prohibited commercialized surrogacy is that women will not want to
be surrogates in the United States because there is no financial incentive. As a result, a concern is
that women exploring surrogacy as a method of reproductive assistance technology to have a
child will hire a surrogate in another country. 158 Surrogacy tourism is common, especially in
India, where a woman from the United States can hire a surrogate in India for a lower-cost than
what would be expected as payment in the United States. 159 However, the surrogacy market in
India is unregulated and because the recommended guidelines are not strictly adhered to, it is
unclear that the surrogates are receiving the proper safety measures. 160 If women from United
States inundate India as a result of lack of willing surrogates in the United States, there is a
concern that Indian women will continue to be exploited for their reproductive services and at a

158

See, London, supra note 10, at 395 (indicating that international surrogacy arrangement have increased over the
last few years, as a result of laws in other countries being restrictive in regards to engaging in surrogacy as a
reproductive technology).
159 See generally, London, supra note 10, at 395 (providing a brief background of the surrogacy arrangements in the
popular surrogacy destination, India).
160 Id.

30

higher frequency if the demand for surrogates increases as a result of noncommercialized
surrogacy in the United States.161
However, there is a solution to this concern that would not prevent the United States from
adopting the proposed model. In order to deter citizens of the United States from going abroad
to engage in commercial surrogacy agreements that may be exploiting women worldwide, the
United States could include in the proposed law that, if a United States citizen enters into a
contract and engages in commercial surrogacy abroad, the child born via the surrogate will not
be granted legal status in the United States. Knowing that the child may not legally be able to
enter, reside or eventually obtain citizenship of the United States may be a deterrent strong
enough to prevent surrogacy tourism and in turn, the exploitation of women abroad.
Another potential criticism of the proposed plan is that economic exploitation may still
exist because including a third party broker cannot prevent either the surrogate or the intended
parent from contacting the other party personally and either offering or demanding compensation
without the broker’s knowledge. Unfortunately, there is always the potential that surrogates may
contact intended parents outside of the agency and demand more money and there is also always
the potential that given how appreciative intended parents may be, they may desire to provide
financial compensation to demonstrate their gratitude.
In examining non-commercial surrogacy agreements, it could be argued that it is
implausible to believe that women will continue to become surrogates and undergo nine months
of pregnancy for a stranger if no financial compensation is provided. However, because
surrogacy would allow for existence only when altruistically motivated, surrogacy agreements
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might become more common between friends and family members, in order to help those closest
to them to achieve a achieve a family. In fact, a move in the direction of the surrogate and
intended parents having a pre-existing relationship may be most beneficial for the surrogate, the
intended parents and for the child. Research that has been conducted to determine whether
surrogacy agreement has been is a successful has indicated that “construction of a positive
relationship between the surrogate and the intended parents” is one factor to ensure a successful
surrogacy agreement.162 When the surrogate is invested in the same outcome as the intended
parent research has shown that is when both parties report the most successful surrogacy
experiences.163 This is most likely to occur when the parties have a good relationship and a key
component of that relationship must be based on trust. 164
Additionally, as highlighted in In re Baby M, the fears that a surrogate is not capable of
making an informed decision and will later refuse to give up the child to the intended parents are
dissuaded by allowing for surrogacy on altruistic motive for two reasons. One reason is that if an
altruistic requirement begins to encourage friends and families of intended parents to act as
surrogates, the more likely it is that the surrogate will be able to remain in the child’s life after
the birth and relinquishing of custody to the intended parents. The surrogate would still be able
to interact with the child, and further the potential pre-existing bond between the surrogate and
the child. Secondly, allowing surrogacy only for altruistic motivations allows both the intended
parents and the surrogate to be invested in the same outcome: the well-being and delivery of a
child. If other compounding factors, such as money, are considered, surrogates and intended
parents may no longer be invested in the same outcome, an essential component for a successful
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surrogacy agreement, because the compensation will force the surrogate to misplace her loyalties
not to the child, but upon the compensation she is receiving.
Therefore, even though the proposed uniform law presents the potential of promoting
surrogacy tourism and exploiting women abroad given that women in the United States may no
longer consider participating in the agreements due to the lack of financial gain, the United
States can enact a statute denying the child legal U.S. citizenship in an attempt to deter couples
from going abroad to participate in commercial surrogacy. Furthermore, even if the potential
number of surrogates in the United States diminishes as a result no financial compensation, this
could result in the best interest of the child. With no compensation, surrogacy may begin to occur
between close family and friends to help those closest to them achieve their desire to have a
family. As a result of the pre-existing relationship, the best interests of the child may promoted
by this surrogacy relationship, as the child will be able to maintain a relationship with both
women and better understand the complexity of the relationship. Although these are concerns
that must be considered, they should not be dispositive of the uniform altruistic surrogacy
arrangement model proposed for the United States.
VI.

Conclusion
As the medical technologies have advanced, the courts have been left to play catch-up in

trying to determine what the best course of action is for all the parties involved. The silence of
the government is no longer an acceptable approach to dealing with this technology, and
legislation must be passed to ensure the rights of all those involved.
Many public policy concerns have been raised in deciding whether to allow for the
existence of surrogacy arrangements. There is one model presently that will allow the United
States to combat all of these concerns with one simple statute, and that is model of the United
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Kingdom. In creating a model similar to the United Kingdom, the United States should adopt a
uniform surrogacy agreement that is motivated by altruism, criminalizes any form of
compensation, with the exception of legal and medical expenses, and provides that the intended
parents of the child will always be listed on the birth certificate as the legal parents. With this
model, not only will the United States be able to curb the opponents’ concerns, but the
government will be able to provide for the best interest of the child, the surrogate, and the
intended parents.
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